by Louis R. Anemone, NYPD Chief of Department (retired)
The current year in New York City exposes issues in community trust in the police, public support of the police, and the NYPD’s ability to prevent violent crime. Variables that have changed recently include changes in the law and the practices and policies of the District Attorneys, New York State Parole, and New York City Correction over the last two-plus years.
Changes include “bail reform,” “raise the age,” refusal to prosecute certain laws, refusal to prosecute bail jumping or non-appearance warrants, refusal to return parole violators to prison, and the emptying of Rikers Island jails, both planned through bail reform and unplanned through COVID. These changes present an enormous burden on the crime prevention efforts of the city and the NYPD. But all is not lost. There are steps that can be taken, even in times of reduced budgets and lower headcount. If the following suggestions can serve to start a discussion within the NYPD and unleash their best efforts at preventing violent crime now and in the future, they will have served their purpose.
Local street-level solutions and initiatives must be encouraged as long as the tactic meets this three-prong test: Is it legal? Is it moral? Is it effective?
While this plan and proposals are specific to New York City, these ideas can be reformulated to other cities and jurisdictions facing rising violence levels. The ideas presented here can bring about substantial positive change in most cities. Crime, like politics, is local. Start at the local level: the precinct, the transit district, and the public housing police service area (PSA).
Precinct, district, or PSA commanders are the quarterbacks of the NYPD crime prevention team. These executives must be given more latitude and authority to manage their commands while also being held accountable at Compstat meetings for crime prevention results. Differences in neighborhoods, crimes, and criminals require tailored solutions by local commanders. Headquarters can monitor, provide personnel, logistics, and cut “red tape,” but equally important headquarters must not become overbearing or discourage risk taking in the field. Headquarters can lobby for support from state and local political officials to change laws, handle press relations, and make the arguments for budget support needed in the field.
Local street-level solutions and initiatives must be encouraged as long as the tactic meets this three-prong test: Is it legal? Is it moral? Is it effective? Of course the effectiveness can’t be known in advance, but it should be measured over time. These local commanders along with the Neighborhood Coordination Officers, are the face of the NYPD to their local communities. They need the confidence and support of upper management when they try in good faith to prevent crime. They should be evaluated on their actions, not only on their outcomes. They should not be punished for a failed tactic when it was attempted in good faith and met the 3 prong test. A small change like this can rejuvenate the spirit of innovation that led to the crime turnaround of the 1990’s.
This support of the local commanders should extend to allowing them to deploy officers as they deem appropriate. Commanders must be allowed to deploy officers (after proper training) in uniformed “conditions” teams as well as in civilian clothed “anti-crime” teams when and where the commander and crime conditions indicate they would be most effective.
The key is “precision policing” as developed and currently practiced by the NYPD. In every neighborhood, most of the residents are law abiding. It is these residents that suffer from a lack of policing. Every New Yorker deserves streets free from the terror of violent criminals. In some neighborhoods, a very small number of people commit almost all of the shootings. These repeat violent offenders – not entire communities – must remain the focus of both police and prosecution. When issues of policing — and those of partners in prosecution, reform, court diversion, and probation—justice demands that the concerns of the community be considered alongside the well-being of the defendant.
Some of this, as they say, is not rocket science.
To reduce gun violence, going after the criminal users of guns is paramount.
When violence occurs in the subways, it is imperative that subway rules be enforced.
When violence occurs in the streets and parks of the city, it is imperative that suspects with outstanding warrants be found and prosecuted.
When gangs are feuding in public and on social media, the gang investigation division is the jewel in the precision policing approach.
As drive-by shootings have increased, it is imperative that police officers conduct traffic enforcement, not with the goal of ticketing to generate revenue, but to seize illegal firearms and prosecute violent offenders. Traffic enforcement must also continue at locations, and days/nights where statistics reveal collisions involving injuries and deaths repeatedly occur.
Public drug dealers, a known nexus of violence, must not return to our streets.
A number of innovations should be implemented as rapidly as possible. Despite fewer officers—resulting both from #defund and greater attrition—immediate steps must be taken to increase street patrols.
MODEL PRECINCTS — The Department has an opportunity with the next graduating class (of 900) from the police academy to create “model precincts.” Three or four of the current precincts experiencing violent crime increases should be selected as a way to truly re-envision policing with a focus on crime prevention.
Let every new idea and plan be rolled out in these model precincts. To start, these precincts would emphasize neighborhood policing, on foot. The 900 new graduates will be assigned to these precincts exclusively, where they will be trained and supervised by hand picked personnel chosen for their knowledge, integrity, and desire to mentor. Planning for this project should start immediately to take advantage of the lead time before the recruits graduate.
Monitor and compare the results in these precincts with comparable non model precincts. If it works, expand the program. If it doesn’t work, try something new.
Every New Yorker deserves streets free from the terror of violent criminals. A very small number of people commit almost all of the shootings. These repeat violent offenders – not entire communities – must remain the focus of both police and prosecution
FOOT PATROL — Increase foot patrols and use intelligence led policing techniques to best prevent the occurrence of violent crime. Officers should be assigned “one armed posts,” solo and not in pairs, in commercial districts, transportation hubs, and other violence-prone locations at the times and days data tell us most crime is occurring.
These officers should walk the post singly, with another officer posted across the street or avenue, on another “one armed post.” These officers will be provided with current crime information and specific direction as to what they can, should, or should not be doing while on patrol. They should be equipped with operating radios, of course, but not phones! The phone, as we all know but nobody wants to admit, is far more often a distraction than a useful policing tool. These officers will become another face of the NYPD to those local communities.
URGENCY — Recreate a “sense of urgency” that the NYPD is about helping residents and preventing violent crime. Compstat, currently once a week, should return to being held twice a week. By doing so, headquarters will see each of the eight police boroughs at least once a month. Compstat, of course, is not a silver bullet solution to crime, but it is an essential tool of accountability in an organization of well over 30,000 police officers.
REDUCE OVER-SPECIALIZATION —During times of reduced headcount and increased violence, over-specialization is a luxury the Department can ill afford. Staffing levels of sworn police officers in Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Divisions must be reduced to allow for the reassignment of these officers back to patrol and other detective assignments. This will help reduce and prevent violent crime. The focus of the Department —while always mindful of history — must remain fixed on the problems of the present.
CLOSE PRECINCTS — Reduce the number of precincts in New York City from 77 to 65. These precinct boundaries and facilities are relics of another time. Issues involving co-terminality with local community boards have been handled in the past and can be handled moving forward.
In each case, neighboring precincts would pick up the workload and officers of any closed precincts. Savings and benefits would be expected immediately in operating costs for repairs, maintenance, and administration. Uniformed personnel currently assigned as staff or administration in these closed precincts will be reassigned to patrol in the neighboring precincts. Civilian employees of the closed precincts would be reassigned to replace uniformed officers currently serving in administrative assignments throughout the Department. This would further increase patrol headcount.
In Manhattan, the 5th, 9th, 17th and 26th precincts would be strong candidates for closing. In the Bronx, candidates could include the 42nd, and 46th precincts. Brooklyn could close the 63rd, 70th, 76th, 84th precincts. Queens could cut the 100th, 110th. Staten Island, with just four precincts, should probably close none. Of course, headquarters would determine and submit the final selections for political and community input and approval. Department history reveals many prior attempts to close police facilities that weren’t successful. The current climate in the city and nation might be a perfect time to resurface this idea.
LESS ADMINISTRATION — An overall “self-portrait” of the Department would reveal large numbers of uniformed officers performing administrative and staff duties. These people must be identified and reassigned to crime prevention duties on patrol or available investigative positions. An embargo on filling empty administrative or staff positions, including at headquarters, with sworn officers must be immediately issued. Civilians must be the first choice to fill these positions, when the positions are needed.
This “self portrait” should also be conducted on a zero sum basis for all staff and administrative units and sub units in the Department. Oftentimes, large organizations lose track of the rationale and purpose for the creation and continuance of special units. If we are serious about preventing violent crime, we must look in every part of the Department for elimination and or combination candidates.
That said, a special dispensation should be given to the Mounted Unit with a concerted effort to grow the unit to 100-125 horses and personnel. Police horses are an invaluable resource both in congested areas like Times Square and also in crowd control situations, especially when other less-lethal tools are being restricted. The decline of this unit must be stopped and reversed.
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Born and raised in Brooklyn, Louis Anemone joined the NYPD in 1964 as a civilian member of the Police Trainee Corps. He served in six patrol precincts and commanded three patrol precincts, a narcotic investigation unit, the Department’s Disorder Control Team, and the elite Special Operations Division. In 1995, Commissioner Bill Bratton promoted Anemone from Chief of Patrol to the Department’s highest uniformed rank, Chief of Department. Chief Anemone retired in 1999.
In the 1990s, Anemone assisted in the development and implementation of the Compstat system, which contributed to major reductions in crime and violence. Anemone’s work as chair of the Department Firearms Discharge Review Board contributed to a 60% decrease in the use of firearms by police officers from 1995 to 1999.
